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Abstract   This paper gives an account of the development of fishery regulation
and management in Iceland, including the development of cod stocks, and the
fishing fleet in Iceland since 1945. There was considerable experimentation with
fishery management systems in Iceland beginning in 1975. Many economists and
others predicted that the fishing fleet would be reduced as a result of the new
regimes, but this has not happened to the extent anticipated. Local governments
have traditionally had a stake in the Icelandic fisheries. The motives of local
municipalities might conflict with the motives pursued by the fishery managers.
A theoretical model is developed to understand the consequences of local politi-
cians’ involvement in the quota market. Furthermore, it is indicated that the
degree of ease with which the less effective fishing firms find ways to circumvent
the profitability consequences of the management regime depends on the initial
allocation of fishing rights.
Key words   Fishing fleet capacity, fishing fleet regulation, ITQs, local commu-
nities.
Introduction
Considerable experimentation with fishery management systems in Iceland began in
1975. Many economists and others predicted a reduction in the size of the fishing
fleet under the new regimes, but this has not happened to the extent hoped for. In
addition, local governments have traditionally had a stake in the Icelandic fisheries.
The reasons for their involvement include job security and enhancement of eco-
nomic activity in the local community. Such motives might conflict with the goals
pursued by the fishery manager.
This paper reviews the development of fishery regulation and management in
Iceland and considers the development of the cod stocks and the fishing fleet in Ice-
land since 1945. A theoretical model is developed to understand the consequences of lo-
cal politicians’ involvement in the quota market. It is concluded that such involvement
in the fisheries would reduce the efficiency of Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) fish-
ery management schemes. Furthermore, it is indicated that the degree of ease with which
the less effective fishing firms find ways to circumvent the profitability consequences
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of the management regime depends on the initial allocation of fishing rights.
A review of fishery regulation and fishery management in Iceland from mid-
century onward is first outlined, followed by an account of local community in-
volvement in Icelandic fisheries since World War II. The section following this his-
tory contains a few thoughts on the connection between fishery management and
fleet size. A model is then developed allowing for a heterogenous fleet of vessels.
Finally, conclusions are presented.
Fishery Regulation and Fishery Management in Iceland
From medieval times until 1948 the regulation of fisheries in Icelandic waters was
aimed mainly at limiting and specifying the type of gear allowable in order to avoid
a “chaos of lines” and similar pitfalls of uncontrolled fishing. In the first half of the
20th century this policy was pursued by restricting the use of relatively advanced
equipment (e.g., bottom trawls and Danish seines, often used by foreigners) on the
traditional fishing grounds of small vessels using traditional fishing equipment.1 Af-
ter 1948 the main goal of fishery management was to protect the spawning and feed-
ing grounds of the demersal species, as well as to ensure that the gear used was
more effective in catching older individuals.2 In other words, the emphasis shifted
from guarding the livelihood of the small-scale fishers and avoiding chaotic use of
gear, to utilizing the growth potential of the demersal fish stocks more effectively.
In 1938 over 55% of the total catch in Icelandic waters was taken by foreign
vessels.3 The foreign vessels all but disappeared during World War II, but returned
with increased catching power after the war. Consequently, reducing the foreign
fishing effort then became the goal of Icelandic fishery management, with the hope
of managing the natural resources in the waters around Iceland in a way that would
strengthen the Icelandic economy. The extension of the fisheries limits from 4 to 12
nautical miles in 1958, from 12 to 50 miles in 1972, and from 50 to 200 miles in
1975 were steps toward that goal.
In 1975 the Marine Research Institute issued a report on the status of the Icelan-
dic cod stocks. The report, nicknamed “The Black Report,” stated that the Icelandic
cod stocks would soon collapse if fishing continued at the same level of effort.4 Sev-
eral weeks later a working committee of the Governmental Science and Research
Council published another report: “Development of Marine Fisheries,” later nick-
named “The Blue Report,” which restated the existence of the “Problem of the Com-
mons” in marine fisheries, even if all the fishermen were of the same nationality.5
This report concluded that the fishery management methods used at the time were
aimed at guarding the interests of occupationally or geographically defined groups
1 Sigurdur Snævarr (1993), p. 182, and Sigfús Jónsson (1984) pp. 124–25.
2 Sigfús Jónsson (1984) pp. 242–43.
3 Fiskifélag Íslands, Útvegur 1992, p. 491.
4 Actually, the report called for almost a 50% reduction of the cod catch, from roughly 400,000 metric
tons to 230,000 metric tons in 1976. Halldór Jónsson (1990) p. 114.
5 Icelanders had argued that competition among fishermen from different nations pursuing different
goals with respect to the quantity and quality of fish brought ashore could lead to inefficient use of the
resource. Foreigners would be concerned about balancing the cost and revenue for each given trip,
whereas natives would take future catches into account in deciding what to fish and when to do it.
Hence, the mood in Iceland had been: Get rid of foreigners from inside the 200 mile limit so that we can
manage the resource in a responsible manner. Not until the “Blue Report” was published, had it been
stated so forcefully that Icelandic boat owners could come to strike the “wrong” balance between their
own present revenue and the future catches of all boat owners. The “Blue Report” made it clear that
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in Iceland, but had no roots in the biological sciences or economics. The heated de-
bate that followed resulted in the establishment of a rudimentary effort restriction
system. The effort restriction system banned trawlers, the most efficient vessels,
from fishing cod during a specific number of days each year.6 The investment in
new vessels was to be conditional on the removal of older vessels from the fishing
fleet.7 This effort-controlling management system was in operation until 1984. In
1981 it was augmented by a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) target. The effort restric-
tion experiment was negative on two counts: (1) The capacity of the fishing fleet
continued to grow as fishing was still profitable and politicians could not resist pres-
sure from would-be boat owners (figure 1 and table 1). Therefore, the overall cost of
bringing a given TAC ashore was considered to be unnecessarily high. (2) It proved
impossible to keep the actual catch in line with the TAC because the relation be-
tween effort and catch was not stable.8
After a short debate in 1983 from December 12th to the 28th, the Icelandic par-
liament empowered the Ministry of Fisheries to set the TAC inside the Icelandic
fisheries’ limits and to give an allotment to fishing vessels (Act 82/1983). In Febru-
ary 1984 the Ministry allotted a quota to each vessel according to a complicated set
of rules. The catch history of the vessel during the period 1 November 1980 through
31 September 1983 was the basis for the vessel quota.9
In 1985 the catch quota system was extended for another year. The conditions
that a vessel owner had to fulfill to be eligible for choosing effort restrictions (still
augmented by a catch limit for cod), rather than catch restrictions, were eased. In
1986 the catch quota system was extended for two years. Some steps were taken to
eliminate the effort quota. Again in 1988 the catch quota system was extended for
another two years. The Icelandic parliament also augmented the first paragraph of
the Fisheries Management Act to declare that the fish stocks in the waters around
Iceland are the property of the Icelandic people. In 1990 a law was passed that made
the catch quota system more permanent. The law eliminated the effort quota and ex-
tended the quota system to vessels between 6 and 10 tons, in addition to vessels 10
tons and over. At each turn, transferability of the catch quota was made easier.
The Role of Normative Fisheries Economics in Iceland
In the debate on how to manage the fisheries, Icelandic fisheries economists made
the case for ITQs.10 Arnason (1990) concludes that fisheries management systems
suggested earlier in the literature call upon the fisheries manager to calculate the op-
6 Other vessels were also subject to this rule of codless days, but that regulation was less extensive.
7 A governmental decree from the Ministry of the Fisheries, dated 14 July 1977 banned all vessels from
catching cod inside the Icelandic Fisheries limit for a period of one week. Furthermore, all trawlers had
to avoid cod for thirty days during the period of 14 July to 15 November of that year. Similar steps were
taken during the period of the effort quota when the catch exceeded the target.
8 Halldór Jónsson (1990), p. 116.
9 Owners of vessels that were not in use during that period, or owners that had recently bought an old
vessel and owners of vessels that had hired a new skipper since the end of the catch-history-period,
could choose effort restrictions (“codless-days”). The decree allowed limited transferability of the allot-
ted catch quotas, conditional on the agreement of the Ministry of Fisheries, the local chapter of the
Fishermens’ Union and the local authorities. (Government of Iceland: “Reglugerd um stjórn
botnfiskveida 1984,” Nr. 44/1984). The establishment of the catch quotas was regarded as a provisional
decision to be revised within a year. The law and the decree were largely in line with the recommenda-
tions of The Fisheries Convention (Fiskithing), a body that counts both boat owners and fishermen as its
members [Halldór Jónsson (1990) and Pálsson and Helgason (1995)].
10 Arnason (1990), Pálsson and Helgason (1996), Helgason (1995), Halldór Jónsson (1990), and
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timal level of taxes or subsidies in order to induce the right amount of fishing effort.
He argues that the data required to perform these calculations are beyond the capac-
ity of the manager to acquire. He subsequently states that a system of ITQs allevi-
ates the information problem. Then, provided that a reasonably efficient quota mar-
ket exists, the use of ITQs will also ensure that any total allowable catch will be har-
vested efficiently.
Figure 1.  Value of Icelandic Fishing Fleet (right scale, 1980 = 100),
Size of Icelandic Cod Stocks and Size of Catches of
Icelandic Cod by Icelandic Vessels (left scale, metric tons)
Table 1
Icelandic Fishing Vessel Fleet Size, Size of the Fishable
Cod Stocks and Size of Icelandic Cod Catches, 1977–94.
Change in Change in Size Change in Size of
Period Size of Fleet of Fishable Cod stock Icelandic Catches
1977–1984, rudimentary +17% –26% –15%
“total” effort quota
1984–1990, +25% –6.5% +18%
rudimentary ITQs
1990–1994, –3% –29.5% –35%
revised ITQs
Sources: National Economic Institute and Marine Research InstituteLocal Government and the Icelandic ITQ Market 111
The discussion among fisheries economists influenced the Icelandic discourse
on fisheries’ management while the management system was under reconstruction.11
The main conclusions from this normative fisheries economics literature rest upon
several assumptions that are often implicitly made. First, it is usually assumed that it
costs nothing to enforce the quota system. Fishery managers are assumed to be able
to allot quotas and decide the yearly TAC without interference from boat owners,
freezing plant owners, municipal councils, or other stakeholders. Second, it is usu-
ally assumed that fishing firms do not try to cheat and harvest more than the allotted
quota of a given species. Therefore, the costly enforcement actions of the fisheries
manager in reality are not modeled. It is shown in Matthiasson (1996a) that, if this
assumption of cost-free enforcement is relaxed, some of the efficiency gain that the
quota system yields may actually be an illusion as the cost of enforcement, and the
benefits of control, accrue to different groups of people. Thirdly, fishing firms are
explicitly supposed to be atomistic profit-maximizers without political leverage to
gain subsidization of key inputs. This assumption has vast consequences for conclu-
sions of the models. Some implications of having local community politicians using
tax money to subsidize local firms on the quota market will be considered in a for-
mal model later in this paper.12
Has Regulation Had a Substantial Effect on Fleet Size?
The need for fisheries management follows from the “tragedy of the commons” ar-
gument. The fishing fleet exceeds the productive capacity of the utilized fish stocks
and fish stocks tend to be reduced to such an extent that fishing costs are unneces-
sarily high. Fisheries management must therefore have a significant effect on the
biomass of fish and/or size of the fishing fleet.
Figure 1 shows the value of the Icelandic fishing fleet (in constant prices), the
size of Icelandic cod stocks, and the size of the catches of Icelandic cod by Icelandic
vessels. Judging from the normative literature one would expect the introduction of
the various fishery management systems to induce an adjustment of the size of the
fleet to the capacity of the fishing stocks. This has not happened. The value of the
Icelandic vessels increased for most of the period from 1974 to 1994, with the ex-
ception of the last few years. In contrast the fishable stocks of cod reached the high-
est estimated value in 1980, and then a temporary low in 1983 followed by an all-
time low in 1992. Icelandic cod catches show much less variability than do both the
size of the fleet and the sizes of the fish stocks. According to the estimates of Icelan-
dic economists, the fishing fleet was much bigger in 1980 than warranted by the car-
rying capacity of the fish stocks.13 Consequently, it should be safe to conclude that
the fleet size did not adjust to the carrying capacity of the fish stocks during the pe-
riod under investigation.
Table 1 further documents the apparent inefficiency of the rudimentary manage-
ment systems. The fishing fleet continued to grow throughout the first two periods
at considerable speed and the Icelandic catches were obviously in excess of the ca-
pacity of the resource. In 1990–94 the growth of the fleet stopped, with catches ap-
11 Halldór Jónsson (1990), Neher, Arnason, and Mollett (1989), and Helgason (1995).
12 Other authors have raised doubts about the conclusions of the normative literature on different
grounds. Wilson, Acheson, Metcalfe, and Kleban (1994) state that the relation between fishing and size
of the fish stocks is complex and probably chaotic. They state that ITQs are but one variation of what
they call “numerical management schemes.” The main weakness of such schemes is that they require an
unreasonable amount of information.
13 Thorvaldur Gylfason (1991, p. 41) quotes a statement made by Ragnar Arnason, where Arnason, in a
paper from 1984, estimates the excess capacity in the Icelandic fishing fleet to be roughly 40%.Matthiasson 112
parently more in line with the growth potential of the stocks. This may have been
due to a better management system. In all likelihood the persistent decline in the
fishable cod stocks (the most valuable fish stocks) would eventually have triggered
downsizing of the fleet. However, a successful fisheries management scheme should
have induced a quicker and more extensive downsizing of the fleet.
In summary, the evidence from the data presented above indicates that the fish-
eries management systems adopted in Iceland did not alleviate the considerable ex-
cess capacity problem that existed. Furthermore, the cod stocks did not show signs
of recovery until after 1994. The predictions of the performance of the new fishery
management schemes were largely based on theoretical experiments. Experience
from other fisheries management systems [see Townsend (1990)] indicates that theo-
retically-based predictions of the performance of such systems may be inexact.
Local Municipalities as Stakeholders in Fishing Firms
It is common in many countries for municipalities to operate their utilities as not-
for-profit organizations. In Iceland, local authorities organize the distribution of
electricity and geothermal water, the operation of harbors, etc., in this manner. Non-
profit operations are also of significance in the case of municipal engagement in the
fisheries, which could possibly account for the discrepancy between expected and
observed behavior of fishing firms with respect to capacity reduction.14 In Iceland
municipal ownership or partial ownership of fishing firms has historically been, and
still is, important. Occasionally, municipalities have operated fishing firms as not-
for-profit enterprises, although the organizational form of the limited liability com-
pany is also in use.15
The municipalities have often stepped in when other investors have not been
willing to risk their money in the operation of the firm. The dismantling of a local
firm could imply that its productive assets would be located in a different munici-
pality. An integrated fishing firm is often the backbone of economic activity in a
given coastal community.16 The municipality loses tax income in the wake of fishing
firm downsizing and relocation. The municipalities may, in their short-run calcula-
tions of the returns for “saving” a fishing firm from being relocated, come to con-
clusions that differ from those that would be reached by a private investor. The local
council should be expected to have a broader set of goals than profit-maximization
when they decide if and how to become involved in the management of a fishing
firm. The local council should be expected to regard their assets in a fishing firm on
a par with assets in a hospital, a school, or a public transportation utility. Not only
14 A profit maximizing firm buying and selling inputs and outputs in atomistic markets will in the long-
run have to operate at the bottom of its average cost curve. A not-for-profit firm will not be forced to
economize with inputs in this manner. Specificially, such a firm will not be forced to economize use of
capital equipment or marketable catch quotas to the same extent as a profit-maximizing firm would do.
Hence, a fishing vessel fleet operated partly by not-for-profit firms and a fishing fleet only operated by
profit-maximizing firms may react differently to various fishery management schemes. For elaboration
see Matthiasson (1996b).
15 Local municipal ownership of shares in local fishing firms may be of different historical origin in
each case. The municipal council may have been one of the founders, or even the only founder, of a
fishing firm. The municipal council may have acquired stock in the fishing firm as a result of financial re-
structuring, either in exchange for writing off debt or in exchange for cash. Hence, for a variety of reasons,
local municipalities may hold the majority or a large minority of shares in fishing firms located in the com-
munity. Local municipalities may step in and buy shares in firms that otherwise might be moved out of the
municipality. And local municipalities may sell shares they have acquired in the past at below market
price on the condition that the assets of the firm are kept inside the boundaries of the municipality.
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do the municipalities have a broader set of goals than would a private investor, but
they also command a broader set of financial instruments than would a private in-
vestor. Local municipal authorities can, for instance, put future tax revenue up as
collateral for loans, an action extensively used by Icelandic municipal councils, as
documented in table 3.
The extent of municipal ownership of shares in fishing firms is not available,17
but the municipalities were a big player in the renewal of the capital intensive part
of the fishing fleet after World War II (table 2).
Most of the trawlers operated in the 1950s and 1960s were built after World War II.
Many of the local governments that had a stake in fishing organized their operation as a
public utility. Others organized the operation in the form of a private company.
Due to the changed economic conditions, hardly any new investment was made
in trawlers during the 1960s. But in the 1970s, the government offered generous
loans to facilitate investment in new trawlers. In the period of a few years 100 new
big stern trawlers were bought to operate in Icelandic waters.18 Unfortunately, no
comprehensive study similar to the one reported in table 2 exists, but a quick esti-
mate shows that municipally controlled companies acquired one-third to one-quarter
of the new stern trawlers.
All the utility-organized municipal fishing firms have been reorganized as lim-
ited liability companies, but the local authorities still hold a big stake in the trans-
formed companies. The reasons for the reorganization are many, and include a gen-
eral drive for privatization of public firms, and the need for financial and organiza-
tional restructuring of the Icelandic fishing industry in response to the scarcity of
fish in the early 1980s.
In 1993 the Federation of Icelandic Municipalities (Samband íslenskra
sveitarfélaga) conducted a survey among its members regarding new financial com-
mitments granted to businesses. Table 3 shows how these commitments have
evolved during the period 1987–91.
In the first two years, aid was mostly in the form of loan guarantees. In more
recent years the municipalities extended their involvement in fishing firms by in-
17 Arnason (1995) estimates that 5% of total shares are in the hands of municipalities. Eythórsson (1996)
states that in the early 1980s, 10% to 20% of the industry was under municipal ownership. These figures
underestimate the responsibility of the local authorities. In communities where an integrated fishing
firm is the major source of jobs, the municipal council may have to choose between guaranteeing a loan
to the fishing firm or relocation of the fishing activity.
18 Sigfús Jónsson (1991), pp. 146–47.
Table 2
Ownership of Icelandic Trawlers, 1945–70.
Number of Trawlers
Owned and Operated by
Number of Trawlers Central or Local Governments,
Total Number of Owned and Operated or by Firms Where Local
Year Icelandic Trawlers by Private Firms Governments Hold Majority
1945 29 27 2
1947 32 24 8
1950 35 18 17
1960 45 20 25
1970 22 10 12
Source: Thorleifur Óskarsson (1991), pp. 252–54.Matthiasson 114
creasing their equity holdings. That this change coincided with the introduction of a
more thorough implementation of the ITQ system may be pure coincidence. But lo-
cal governments are increasing their involvement in the fisheries, and the fishing in-
dustry has increased its total share of municipal aid from slightly more than 36% in
1989 to 65% to 75% in later years.
Municipal help to fishing firms can also be significant in per capita terms (fig-
ure 2). The figures for gross capital transfers should be compared to the per capita
income from municipal taxes, which were ISK 100,000 in 1992. Per capita munici-
pal expenditure on health and welfare was approximately ISK 5,000 that year, ISK
25,000 on education, and ISK 20,000 on road construction. Hence, it may be con-
cluded that money transfers by municipalities to and from fisheries firms are of con-
siderable size and importance for some small municipalities, though these transfers
are more modest in size in the aggregate (appendix 1).
Management and Fleet Size
The Icelandic fishing fleet has contracted slowly in the wake of the introduction of
stiff management schemes. Other researchers have also observed a slow response to
ITQ regulated fisheries. This result can be attributed to a variety of factors. The
value of waiting is an explanation suggested by Just and Weninger (1997). Accord-
ing to them, the delayed exit of fishermen from the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and
ocean quahog fisheries occurs because of the existence of uncertainty and the low
opportunity cost of keeping a vessel and the right associated with it. Brod and Shobe
(1996) observe that Atlantic wreckfish fishers off the east coast of the USA hold
onto allotted fishing rights even if they do not exercise them during a season, and
even if potential buyers are present in the market. Brod and Shobe argue that fisher-
men or boat owners hold fishing rights as a form of job insurance.
In Iceland, a number of municipal councils either own shares in a fishing firm
or they have supplied collateral for substantial loans to fishing firms (table 3), moti-
vated usually by job creation or job preservation considerations.
There may be a link between the response of fishing firms to the fishery man-
agement schemes and municipal responsibility. To be more concrete one might ask:
How will it affect the working of the ITQ system if municipal councils subsidize
Table 3
New Financial Commitments by Municipalities to Fishing and
Fish Processing Firms, 1987 to 1991 (millions of 1991 krónur).
Type of Commitment
by the Municipalities 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
New equity holdings 52.0 32.4 219.9 416.8 359.4
New loans to fishing firms 10.6 23.5 24.9 3.7 59.1
Tax write-offs 3.3 0.4 7.0 6.2 4.8
Direct subsidies 1.8 2.3 0.1 0.1 1.9
Loan guarantees 119.6 224.1 476.2 151.0 262.9
Total 187.3 282.7 728.1 577.8 688.1
To all industries 516.4 523.0 913.4 865.9 929.9
Fishing industry share 36.27% 54.05% 79.71% 66.73% 74.00%
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low-efficiency fishing firms to insure that those firms acquire sufficient quotas to
keep their operation minimally affected by the ITQ system? In the following sec-
tions of this paper a theoretical model is developed to answer this question.
The Model
The discussion will be conducted in several stages. First, the free access situation
will be considered. Under free access, all would-be vessel owners are allowed to test
their ability and operate a vessel. Equilibrium in the industry is reached when there
are no would-be vessel owners capable of earning positive rents outside of the in-
dustry. The next step is to consider the socially optimal solution. The need to do so
arises from the externality that arises because of the fact that tomorrow’s catch
hinges on today’s conservation. The third step is to consider whether ITQs solve the
social planners’ problem. A fourth step is to consider the working of an ITQ system
where low-efficiency vessels receive a subsidy to buy quotas.
The Free Access System
The model employed is a modified version of the model by Grafton (1992). I will
indicate where my version differs from Grafton’s version. The Grafton paper can be
Figure 2.  Per Capita Municipal Investment in Fishery Firms and
Gross Capital Transfers from Fishing Firms According to the
Size of Municipality, 1991–93 (source: see appendix 1).Matthiasson 116
consulted for justification of simplifications and assumptions.
Assume that a fishing fleet consists of a number of vessels of different produc-
tivity.19 Productivity differences between equally equipped vessels have been ob-
served in many fisheries around the world, [see Acherson (1981) for a review]. Rank
vessels such that the most efficient vessels acquire the lowest index. Assume further
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Here Ci is the cost of operating vessel i for one year, assuming that total catch dur-
ing the year is qi and that the size of the fish stock utilized is b. K stands for fixed
costs associated with starting a fishing firm. These costs must be covered as the
analysis is long-term, deterministic, and steady state. Hence, investors will only risk
their money on a project if they are sure of both covering fixed costs and earning
interest on the initial investment during the lifetime of the vessel. The market rate of
interest is r, and c is a constant.20 The cost will increase in quadratic terms with the
catch, ceteris paribus. The productivity difference between vessels is such that it
will be three times more expensive for the second most efficient vessel to catch a
given amount of fish than for the most efficient one. This productivity difference be-
tween vessels decreases as less effective vessels are compared.21 Hence, the costs of
bringing a given catch ashore would be 20% higher for the eleventh most effective,
than for the tenth most effective vessel. This relative cost distance has fallen to 2%
for the hundred-first and the hundreth most efficient vessels.
The cost function represented above can be viewed as a generalization of the
cost function represented in Grafton (1992). For simplicity it will be assumed that
the fixed cost, K, is equal across vessels.22 This cost element is tied to various ex-
penses such as the vessel owner’s legal expenses related to getting the vessel into
operation, expenses accruing due to the process of learning about rules and regula-
tions that must be obeyed, etc. Relaxing the assumption of uniform K across vessels
would complicate matters without adding much new insight.
Now, the profit from operation of vessel i can be written as:
Π ii i i pq C = –   i = 2, …, N + 1 (2)
The first-order condition from profit-maximization is that:
19 This assumption differs from assumption 2 in Arnason (1990). Arnason assumes that all fishing firms
are alike. For extension of the Arnason paper covering the more realistic heterogeneous case, consult
Heaps (1993). Heaps shows that Arnason’s conclusions may hinge on the homogeneity assumption.
20 The parameter c can be interpreted as being the (exogenous) unit cost of effort. Assume free competi-
tion on all input- and output-markets. By duality theory qi =  be i i 21 (–) . Here e is fishing effort. Fish-
ing effort is produced by use of oil, gear, labor, vessel capacity, etc. Insert this last result in equation (1)
to yield: Ci = ce + rK. Hence, c can be interpreted as cost of fishery effort. See also Grafton (1992).
Exogenous unit cost of effort is widely employed in fisheries economics [e.g., Clark, Clark, and Munro
(1979); and Conrad and Clark (1987)]. For critical discussion of production and cost functions as used
in the fishery literature, see Doll (1988).
21 Acherson (1981) cites Wadel (1972) to the effect that in Newfoundland one purse seiner may catch as
much as five or ten less productive ones. Acherson cites another source, claiming that in one place 15%
of the fishermen harvested 50% of the landings. For discussion regarding productivity differences be-
tween skippers in Iceland, see Pálsson (1987), Durrenberger and Palsson (1986), Thorlindsson (1988),
and Thorlindsson (1994).
22 Grafton models a fleet consisting of two efficiency categories of vessels. Fixed costs can vary. In this
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The second-order condition for profit maximum is satisfied.
As production units differ in terms of productivity, intramarginal rents will be
earned on the more efficient vessels. An owner of production skills will consider en-
tering the industry if rents to be earned are nonnegative. For the last vessel, the deci-
sion of the owner of production skills will be invariant as to whether to put his re-




















Assume, as does Grafton (1992), that there is a parabolic relationship between a
steady state harvest and the fish stock biomass:









Here, b is the biomass of the fish stock, b  is the maximum biomass and B is a constant.
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For proof, consult Sydsaeter and Hammond (1995, p. 852).







Hence, the steady state free-access-biomass (bfa) will decrease with the price of the
landed catch, p and increase as variable costs (represented by c) increase. Note also that
the steady state biomass will increase as the constants B and b  increase. Furthermore,
from equation (5) we know that the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is harvested if
the stock is kept at the level  1
2 b. From equation (7) we see that the free access situ-
ation will induce maximal harvest from the resource in the instance when p/c = B.
Now, combining equations (3), (4), and (5), ignoring integer problems, yields:
N
pbB
p c B crK
≅
+ () 2 (8)
Hence, it may be deduced from equation (8) that the number of vessels practicingMatthiasson 118
steady state harvesting will increase with an increased p, and fall with an increase in
the market rate of interest, r. The number of vessels will also be reduced when fixed
costs are increased.
The above results can be explained by the fact that when the price of the landed
catch increases, more vessels will be put in the water at the same time as each existing
vessel owner tries to expand his operation. But the growth potential of the fish stocks is
unaffected by the increase in price. Hence, equilibrium in the industry will not be re-
stored until the fish stocks have been reduced so that the costs faced by each vessel are
inflated and catch per vessel reduced. Utilizing equations (3) and (7) it may be shown















Hence, if B > p/c, then catch per vessel will increase, but decrease if B < p/c. The
reason for this ambiguity is that when B > p/c, the biostock is bigger than the maxi-
mum sustainable yield biostock,  1
2 b. Hence, if the situation is such as described, to-
tal harvest can be increased by diminishing the stock. Consequently, the stock can
sustain both a higher number of vessels and an increased catch per vessel. In the
case that B < p/c, the situation is reversed.
Solution of the Social Planners’ Problem
The problem of the social planner is to maximize the (annualized) long-term rents
from the fishing industry, taking into account the biological facts. Successful manage-
ment of the resource may change the market for the product23 and hence influence the
product price. Successful management may also affect the unit price of effort.24 It will be
assumed in the remainder of the paper that product and input prices are uninfluenced by
the conduct of the fisheries manager or the fishery management scheme chosen.
The objective of the fisheries manager can be written as follows:
max –
() ( – )
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Here, S is the number of vessels associated with a socially optimal fishery.
The first-order conditions for the solution of this problem are given by equa-









2 λ=    i = 2, …, S + 1 (11)
Here λ  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint in equation
(10). This multiplier can be interpreted as the shadow value of the resource.
Secondly, the biomass should be kept at such a level that the following condi-
tion is fulfilled:
23 For examples of this see Matulich, Mittelhammer, and Reberte (1996) footnote 4.
24 An example of this effect on costs occurs if demand for some special factors decreases. If these fac-
tors are in fixed supply and if they have few alternative uses, their price might be reduced, thus reducing
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Lastly, if the growth potential of the stock is not fully utilized, then the shadow
value of the resource should be set to zero:














0 –( – ) λ (14)
The system (11) to (14) consists of S + 3 equations that determine the endogenous
variables q2, …, qS+1, S, b, and λ . The exogenous variables are p, c, B, and b. After
some terse algebra [using equation (11) to isolate qi inserting that result in equations








Here the subscript so indicates that it is the socially optimal size of the biomass
which is under consideration. Hence, the bigger B is, the bigger the optimal biomass
is. Or in other words, a fast growing fish stock should be kept large. Note also that
the higher the on-shore price p is relative to the effort-unit price c, the closer is the















Hence, the shadow value of the resource is always less than the price of catch. Note
also that the shadow value is lower as a percentage of the on-shore price, the faster
the growth of the stock (the bigger is B in other words). Finally we have:
S
pBb
B p c crK
=
+ () 22 (18)
It is straightforward to establish from equations (7) and (15) that:
bso > bfa (19)Matthiasson 120











Hence, N > S, so that the free access solution is established with more vessels than
is socially optimal, while equation (19) shows that under free access the biostock is
suboptimal.
The discussion above demonstrates that the predictions of the model are much
in line with conventional wisdom in this field, as is to be expected.
Implementing the Optimal Solution
If we ignore the problem of transferring the system from one steady state to another,
then at first glance a simple solution of the social planners’ problem would seem to be to
collect a landing tax of (p2/c)/(p/c + B) for every kilo of catch brought ashore. Each ves-
sel owner should then operate his vessel at the socially correct level and the number of
vessels should be socially optimal. This solution would require that the fishery manager
estimate B, c, and p. Such estimation may be a complicated matter. Note that the prob-
lem of “race for fish” or “Derby-fishing” emphasized by Dupont (1991) would not arise
in the context of the present model as it would be uneconomical for each vessel owner
to expand his catch beyond the socially optimal catch for his vessel.25
Other forms of regulation have also been proposed based on the fact that B may
be hard to measure, and even hard to define and still harder to update. In practical
settings the fishery manager would be required to announce the magnitude of the
landing tax some period into the future. The periodic and erratic nature of fisheries
would make such a task very hard and even impossible.
Landed catch is easily measured and defined and has been measured through the
years for purposes other than those tied to fishery management; hence, the idea of
basing regulation on catch quotas rather than, or supplemental to, landing taxes.26 In
a homogenous fleet the problem of the fishery manager might be solved by allocating
catch quotas of equal size to each vessel, observing the assumed carrying capacity of the
fish stock. In heterogenous fleets, like the one that is analyzed in the present paper, the
establishment of the socially “correct” quota distribution is a more demanding task. One
approach is to distribute nontransferable fishing rights for free, based on the catch his-
tory of each vessel or each skipper. Such handing out of rights can result in suboptimal
distribution of rights. In order to correct misallocations, the suggestion is to make
fishing rights transferable and marketable. Hopefully, under such a system
misallocations of quotas would be corrected on the quota market.
The income accruing to a vessel operating under a quota regime with individual
transferable quota rights when those rights are distributed for free comes from two
sources. One source is the profit from operating the vessel, the other source is the
25 This might require that TACs be set for very short seasons at each time. Hence, the problem of Derby-
fishing might surface in a more realistic version of the present model.
26 Ideally, the information needed for calculating a “correct” level of a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) is
no less than the information needed for calculating the optimal level of a landing tax. But fishery man-
agement schemes are usually established as a result of overfishing. Hence, most of the stakeholders in
the fishery accept a need to restrict the catch. The link between catch restriction and announced TAC is
clear and obvious. The link between a landing tax and restriction of catch may be less obvious. Hence, it
may be easier to gain acceptance for a TAC among fishers than for a landing tax.Local Government and the Icelandic ITQ Market 121
(imputed) rental value of the quota initially awarded. Hence, the income accruing
may be written as:
Π i + Γ Ai = pqi – Ci – Γα i (21)
Here Γ  is market (rental-) price of the quota, Ai is initial allocation of the quota,
while α i is the quota bought or rented. If the quota is rented out, then α i < 0 and –Γα i >
0, representing an additional source of profit. When the right to fish is rented from
someone else, α i > 0, and –Γα i < 0 and thus a cost, as discussed. Each vessel has to ob-
serve the requirement that the catch is not in excess of the quota allocated and/or rented:
qi ≤  Ai + α i (22)
A requirement that agents make use of all productive assets ensures that equation
(22) is fulfilled with equality.









2 Γ=   i = 2, …, J + 1 (23)
Rearranging equation (23) and summing over all i, ignoring the serious problem of
discarding by assuming that total allowable catch (TAC) equals actual catch, ∑ iqi =






















1  and that the size of the fish stock equals the socially









Hence, the quota price and the shadow price of the resource coincide according to
the socially optimal solution. Consequently, the ITQ system will yield the socially
optimal solution as long as the system is correctly described by equations (23)
through (25). Hence, it may be concluded that:
S = J (26)
Thus, the number of vessels under ITQs is equal to the socially optimal number of
vessels.
Robustness of the Solution
The transition from free access to the optimal solution will require some reduction
of the fleet. Hence, it may be that implementation of an ITQ regime will induce
some vessel owners to take their vessels out of operation. Such an act may have
consequences in the local community where this happens. For instance, the localMatthiasson 122
processing sector may experience a drop in supply of fresh fish.27 Consider now the
situation where the politicians in the municipalities of the L–M least effective ves-
sels subsidize the fishing firms by paying part of the quota price out of municipal
funds.28 Denote the subsidization rate as γ . Such subsidization will affect the equi-
librium rental price of the quota on the market. Assume that M≈ M + 1. Further as-
sume that total catch is given as:
















Now, qi is given by equation (23). Subsidized firms are faced with the quota price
(1 – γ )Γ . Consequently, a subsidized firm supply of catch, qj is not given by equa-










Hence, utilizing equations (23), (27), and (28), the equilibrium rental price of a
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Here the subscript lc indicates that the quota lease price is influenced by local com-
munities subsidizing the low-efficiency vessels. It may be checked that if L = 0, then
equations (29) and (24) yield (almost) identical results. Now, for L, γ  > 0 the term
which accompanies p on the right-hand-side of equation (29)
() ( ) –










Furthermore, we have that the term accompanying TAC*c/b2:
() ( )










Hence, it may be concluded that:
Γ lc > λ (30)
27 For a detailed analysis of how fishery management affects the processing sector, consult Matulich,
Mittelhammer, and Reberte (1996).
28 There are many ways how this might be done. For example, one way is that the municipality rented
and rerented the quota to the low efficiency firm at a reduced price. Or the municipality could supply mu-
nicipal services at a reduced price as long as the firm brought its catch to shore in that municipality, etc.Local Government and the Icelandic ITQ Market 123
Consequently, the quota system solution and the social planner solution will no
longer coincide. The high-efficiency and nonsubsidized vessels will be underutilized
as compared to the socially optimal solution, while the subsidized and low-effi-
ciency vessels will fish more than is optimal. Furthermore, the number of vessels
will be higher than in the socially optimal solution. As local politicians subsidize lo-
cal firms in the quota market, demand for quotas is increased and the price of a
quota increases, as quotas are in restricted supply. The nonsubsidized vessels will
face higher costs than they would have had the subsidization not taken place. Hence,
the nonsubsidized vessels will restrict their operation as compared with the optimal
solution.
When Will ITQs be Successful?
The ITQ system may replicate the socially optimal solution if left alone and imple-
mented according to the book.29 But when the fishery manager and managers at
other levels of government have conflicting goals, the ITQ system may produce so-
cially suboptimal solutions. Remember that the municipal politicians are playing a
very serious game against each other. All of them will believe, rightly or wrongly,
that the future of their community hinges on the quota holdings of fishing firms in
their community. They will know that the firm that loses its quota will shut down its
operation, presumably adding people to the list of unemployed. Hence, they will
find themselves forced to participate in the race for keeping quotas in their commu-
nities.
It is to be expected that ITQ systems implemented in unimportant fisheries fare bet-
ter than ITQ systems implemented in important fisheries because local politicians are
unlikely to pay attention to a regulated fishery that employs relatively few people.
We can also expect that ITQ systems implemented in centralized fisheries are
successful. If all fishers and vessels come from only one municipality, fishing inter-
ests are less likely to get the politicians involved in a quota-grab race than when the
industry is dispersed among several municipalities.
Some fisheries are based on migrating stocks that change their pattern of migra-
tion from time to time, like capelin and the once large and variable Atlanto-Scandic
herring stock. Which harbors are favored by the skippers and the owners of the ves-
sels depends on the behavior of the stock at each time. Hence, having a stake in
these fisheries is less likely to produce results in terms of local employment than
would a stake in more stable fisheries. Thus, local politicians are likely to empha-
size demersal fisheries, rather than pelagic fisheries, at least initially.
29 It is important to note that the ITQ system, even when implemented by the book, can produce socially
suboptimal results. The socially optimal solution is derived on the condition that social costs and ben-
efits are measured by individual willingness-to-pay and by opportunity costs, thus incorporating all sec-
ondary costs and benefits. It is well established that market prices will not reflect opportunity costs in
the face of public goods and externalities.
Furthermore, implementation of a fishery management system can be viewed as a public project.
Evaluation of public projects is based on a social choice rule, implicitly or explicitly given. Hence, a
proposition regarding the relation between the ITQ system and the socially optimal solution must hinge
on the social welfare function applied by the decision maker. Assume that the problem of public goods
and externalities could be ignored. Then the proposition that the ITQ system without lump sum transfers
of wealth from gainers replicating the socially optimal solution would require that all individuals had
equal weight in the social welfare function underlying the social choice rule. Furthermore, the social
choice rule would have to be such that the Kaldor potential Pareto compensation principle applied (so
that benefits were positive if gainers could potentially, rather than actually, compensate the losers).Matthiasson 124
Conclusions
Since 1974 the catch capacity of the Icelandic fishing fleet has been thought to be in
excess of the carrying capacity of the Icelandic fishing stocks. Various fisheries
management schemes have been attempted in order to reduce the excess capacity of
the fleet. The adjustment in the size of the fleet has been slow compared to the
hopes of advocates of fishery management. The model presented in this paper sug-
gests that the considerable involvement of local authorities in the operation of the
Icelandic fishing fleet may be one of the factors responsible for the slow adjustment.
One of the goals of fishery management is to enhance efficiency in production.
Many economists suggest the use of a quota-allotment system to reach that goal.
Most economists acknowledge that different allotment systems have different distri-
butional consequences. Montgomery (1972) showed that the initial distribution of
pollution rights does not affect the efficiency of pollution license programs while
initial allocation is equivalent to a lump sum subsidy. The Arnason (1990) paper can
be viewed as a restatement of this result for the fisheries case [for political conclu-
sions based on the Arnason (1990) paper, consult Arnason and Runolfsson (1991)].
The lesson of the model developed in the present paper is that the method of al-
lotment may matter when firms have the political leverage to influence their profit-
ability conditions as a consequence of the new fishery management system. We can
conclude that the political leverage of fishing firms is higher when ITQs are initially
given away for free than when ITQs are auctioned off. When ITQs are allotted for
free, the cost for a local municipal politician of subsidizing a firm that rents its
quota is γΓ lcα i = γΓ lc[qi – Ai]. Now, if the ITQ were auctioned, but not handed out,
then the cost would be γΓ lcqi > γΓ lcα i, since the full quota rent must be paid. Hence,
the local municipality politician would find it much more expensive to keep up a
given catch ensuring policy when ITQs are auctioned than when they are handed out
initially for free.
Hence, one of possibly many reasons that the Icelandic fishing fleet has been
slow in contracting in the wake of ITQ management may be that the least effective
fishing firms have been able to counteract the profitability consequences of the in-
troduced management system. This may not have been foreseen when the manage-
ment system was initiated.
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Appendix
Municipalities, Investment in Fisheries, and Capital Transfers Received
Number of Investment Capital Transfers Gross Transfers
Inhabitants 000 ISK Received 000 ISK Per Capita
Year Municipality (1) (2) (3) [(2)+(3)]/(1) ISK
1990 All municipalities 255,708 106,867 2,426 427.41
Grindavík 2,172 2,280 1,049.72
Sandgerdi 1,253 2,000 1,596.17
Eyrarsveit 817 6,700 2,426 11,170.13
Patreksfjördur 926 30,000 32,397.41
Ólafsfjördur 1,171 3,418 2,918.87
Gryturbakkahreppur 419 14,775 35,262.53
N.Thingeyjarsysla 1,457 13,512 9,273.85
Neskuapstadur 1,738 4,000 2,301.50
Vopnafjördur 908 27,000 29,735.68
1991 All municipalities 259,577 28,128 13,001 158.45
Keflavík 7,566 13,230 13,000 3,466.83
Eyjafjardarsveit 1,676 1,207 720.17
S.Thingeyjarsysla 1,752 1,090 622.15
Neskuapstadur 1,681 9,999 5,948.25
Eskifjördur 1,036 1,158 1,117.76
1992 All municipalities 262,193 74,115 80,850 591.03
Bolungarvík 1,194 2,146 1,797.32
Dalvík 1,505 1,500 996.68
Seydisfjördur 898 65,000 71,780 152,316.26
Vopnafjördur 888 1,840 2,072.07
Höfn 1,744 500 6,378 3,943.81
1993 All municipalities 264,628 149,380 564.49
Bolungarvík 1,163 30,000 25,795.36
Pingeyri 499 6,015 12,054.11
Ólafsfjördur 1,184 20,554 17,359.80
Dalvík 1,533 7,950 5,185.91
Seydisfjördur 879 25,000 28,441.41
Vopnafjördur 886 3,500 3,950.34
Stokkeyri 534 4,434 8,303.37
Source: Statistics Iceland, local govermental finances, various years.